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NOTES
TORT LAW-MERCHANT'S DUTY TO PROTECT INVITEES
FROM THIRD-PARTY CRIMINAL ACTS-Foster v. Winston-
Salem Joint Venture, 303 N.C. 636, 281 S.E.2d 36 (1981).
INTRODUCTION
During the rush of the Christmas season, a shopper enters a
shopping mall. As she returns to her car in the mall parking lot,
she is assaulted. Although a variety of criminal incidents have been
reported at the mall previously, only one security guard patrols the
premises. The incident "costs" the shopper her injuries, her medi-
cal expenses and, perhaps, absence from work. Should the patron
alone bear the costs of her attack? Or does the shopping mall, as
an invitor, owe a duty to its patron, the invitee, to secure its prem-
ises against foreseeable criminal conduct? It has been held that
whether such a duty should be placed on the landlord or occupant
is a question of fairness, and certainly policy issues abound.1 If
such a duty is imposed, what level or pattern of criminal activity
must occur to put the invitor on notice? When is the likelihood of
criminal conduct so foreseeable that. a duty of protection arises?
And, if the landlord-occupant knows of the risk of criminal attack,
what preventive measures will be adequate?
Historically, the rule in North Carolina has been that one is
not liable for his negligence where the injury flows from the inter-
vening criminal or intentional acts of third parties." Underlying
this rule is the rationale that such acts by third parties are unpre-
dictable and the burden of taking precautions outweighs the ap-
parent risk.3 It has been generally held that unless special circum-
stances exist, there is no duty to protect another from criminal
attack.4 More recently, North Carolina courts and courts of other
states have recognized that a landowner or occupier of premises
1. Goldberg v. Housing Auth. of Newark, 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962).
See infra text accompanying notes 32-34.
2. Ward v. Southern Ry. Co., 206 N.C. 530, 174 S.E. 443 (1934).
3. W. PossER, THm LAw oF ToaTs, § 33, at 173-174, (4th ed. 1971).
4. Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 619 (1966).
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may be liable for injuries suffered by visitors on the premises as a
result of foreseeable hazards created by third parties.5
The Supreme Court of North Carolina's decision in Foster v.
Winston-Salem Joint Venture joins a limited number of decisions
in which courts have allowed liability for injuries sustained
through third party criminal activity because of the foreseeable na-
ture of this activity.6 While applying existing caselaw, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina adopted the position of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, § 344. The Court held that where an invitee
alleges that he was on business premises for the purpose of doing
5. See infra text accompanying notes 23-31, 48-52.
6. 303 N.C. 636, 281 S.E.2d 36 (1981). Cases generally discussing the duty to
protect aganst criminal attack by third parties have discussed such factors as the
existence of an appropriate relationship upon which to predicate a duty; proxi-
mate cause and intervening cause; foreseeability; the economic relationship be-
tween the parties; and the defending party's ability to comply with the duty to
protect. Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 619 (1966). More recent cases, discussing the duty
owed by the shopping center or shopkeeper have noted such factors as foresee-
ability of criminal attack on and off the premises; the character of the business
and past experience; the landowner's ability to deter criminal conduct and the
reasonableness of precautions. Annot., 93 A.L.R.2d 999 (1979). The scope of this
note, however, will be limited to factors relating to foreseeability and the ade-
quacy of precautions.
7. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF ToRTs § 344 (1965) provides:
A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for his
business purposes is subject to liability to members of the public while
they are upon the land for such a purpose, for physical harm caused by
the accidental, negligent, or intentionally harmful acts of third persons
or animals, and by the failure of the possessor to exercise reasonable care
to (a) discover that such acts are being done or are likely to be done, or
(b) give a warning adequate to enable the visitors to avoid the harm, or
otherwise to protect them against it.
Comment f to § 344 further provides:
Since the possessor is not an insurer of the visitor's safety, he is ordi-
narily under no duty to exercise any care until he knows or has reason to
know that the acts of the third person are occurring, or are about to
occur. He may, however, know or have reason to know, from past experi-
ence, that there is a likelihood of conduct on the part of third persons in
general which is likely to endanger the safety of the visitor even though
he has no reason to expect it on the part of any particular individual- If
the place or character of his business, or his past experience, is such that
he should reasonably anticipate careless or criminal conduct on the part
of the third persons, either generally or at some particular time, he may
be under a duty to take precautions against it, and to provide a reasona-
bly sufficient number of servants to afford a reasonable protection.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344, Comment f (1965).
[Vol. 4:411
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business, and that while there he sustained injuries caused by the
the criminal acts of third parties, that these acts were foreseeable
and could have been prevented by the exercise of ordinary care,
then the invitee has stated a cause of action in negligence. 8 Finding
it unnecessary that the defendant foresee the precise nature of the
harm that occurred, the court also held that evidence of at least
twenty-nine assorted criminal incidents in the preceding year was
sufficient to establish a question of fact for the jury.9
THE CASE
In Foster, the plaintiff went to shop at the shopping mall
owned and operated by the defendants. Although the plaintiff
parked near the entrance to a department store, she was beaten
and robbed by unidentified assailants as she returned to her car.
The mall included a parking lot of nearly seventy-six acres, but
only one security guard was assigned to patrol the lot at the time
of the plaintiff's assault. Evidence submitted by the plaintiff and
defendants revealed more than thirty criminal incidents had oc-
curred on the mall premises during the preceding year. Most of
these were automobile larcenies, but four or five were assault-type
crimes. The plaintiff brought this action, claiming that the defen-
dants, owners of the mall, were negligent by failing to provide ade-
quate security for patrons in the mall parking lot. The defendants
contended that the plaintiff's evidence failed to show the foresee-
ability of criminal acts at the mall or the inadequacy of security
measures at the mall. In the defendant's view, for a duty to arise,
the foreseeability required was notice of imminent attack and the
adequacy of measures to deter crime was a matter of speculation.10
8. Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture, 303 N.C. 636, 640, 281 S.E.2d 36,
39 (1981).
9. Id. at 641, 281 S.E.2d at 39. Discrepancies in the number of criminal inci-
dents and assaults contained in this note reflect discrepancies in the various Fos-
ter opinions. The Supreme Court found the plaintiff had alleged at least twenty-
nine criminal incidents preceded her assault, of which four or five were also as-
saults. Additionally, the opinion notes that defendants acknowledged thirty-one
incidents in interrogatories. Id. at 641-642, 281 S.E.2d at 39-40. In dissent,,Justice
Carlton noted thirty-seven incidents and six or seven assaults. Id. at 646-647, 281
S.E.2d at 42-43. The Court of Appeals noted the plaintiff had alleged twenty-
eight criminal incidents although defendant's evidence disclosed thirty-six. Of the
latter, the Court found six or seven were assaults. Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint
Venture, 50 N.C. App. 516, 519, 274 S.E.2d 265, 267 (1981).
10. Brief for Appellee at 3-20, Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture, 50
N.C. App. 516, 274 S.E.2d 265 (1981).
1982] 413
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Before trial, the Davie County Superior Court granted defen-
dant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case. Al-
though the Court of Appeals found that the plaintiff had stated a
cause of action if the facts alleged could have been proven, the
Court upheld defendants' summary judgment." Prior North Caro-
lina decisions had held that in order for the landowners' duty to
protect patrons to arise, it must appear that the owner knew of the
danger of injury or that the danger must have had existed long
enough for the landowner to discover the danger.12 Because only
six or seven of the reported prior criminal incidents were assaults,
the Court of Appeals held that the defendants did not have suffi-
cient notice that the dangerous condition, with respect to assault,
existed. Thus, summary judgment was proper.' Before the North
Carolina Supreme Court, the plaintiff presented two issues: (1)
whether the plaintiff had stated a cause of action in negligence
against the defendants for their alleged failure to provide adequate
security in the mall parking lot; and, (2) if so, whether she
presented sufficient evidence to withstand the defendants' motion
for summary judgment.14
BACKGROUND
Before Foster, North Carolina's position with respect to civil
liability for injuries resulting from the criminal conduct of third
parties was summarized in Ward v. Southern Railway Company." '
There, the plaintiffs intestate, a railroad employee, was killed
when thieves threw coal from a passing train. Evidence at the trial
disclosed that thieves had plagued trains at the place of the dece-
dent's injury for over thirty years. The plaintiff contended that the
railroad's negligence in allowing thieves to steal its property proxi-
mately caused the injured employee's death. The Supreme Court
of North Carolina noted that an employer is liable for all foresee-
able consequences of his negligence when he permits a dangerous
custom to exist in the operation of his business. The Court held,
11. Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture, 50 N.C. App. 516, 517, 274
S.E.2d 265, 266 (1981).
12. Id. at 518, 274 S.E.2d at 267; citing Aaser v. Charlotte, 265 N.C. 494, 144
S.E.2d 610 (1965). See infra text accompanying notes 46-47.
13. Id. at 519, 274 S.E.2d at 267.
14. Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture, 303 N.C. 636, 638, 281 S.E.2d
36, 37 (1981).
15. 206 N.C. 530, 174 S.E.443 (1934).
[Vol. 4:411414
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however, that foreseeable consequences did not include intervening
criminal acts of third persons:
Assuming, but not deciding, that the defendant was negligent
in not taking proper precaution against the coal thieves, neverthe-
less the general rule of law is that if between the negligence and
the injury there is the intervening crime or wilfull and malicious
act of a third person producing the injury but that such was not
intended by the defendant, and could not have been reasonably
foreseen by it, "the causal chain between the original negligence
and accident is broken." (Citations omitted.)'
Subsequent cases involving liability for third party criminal
acts adopted the view expressed in Ward, if not the opinion's pre-
cise language. In Ross v. Atlantic Greyhound Corporation,7 the
Supreme Court of North Carolina found the bus company was not
liable for negligence when a disembarking passenger was struck by
a drunken driver. Applying the identical analysis, the Court in
Williams v. Mickens,1 8 found that a cab driver was not liable for
injuries resulting from the theft of his cab merely because the cab
driver had left his keys in the ignition. In both cases, the defen-
dants' liability was barred by the unforeseeable criminal acts of
third parties.
The common characteristic of Ward and the cases which fol-
lowed was that all rather woodenly declared intentional-criminal
acts of third parties unforeseeable. Hence, no proximate cause.
The pronouncements in Ward, however, were diluted in cases
which addressed the invitor's duty to maintain safe premises for
the use of invitees. These cases extended the scope of this duty
both with respect to geographical areas on the premises and with
respect to dangerous activities on the premises. In determining
whether dangerous conditions had existed long enough on the
premises to give the invitor notice, courts in these cases also
reached the issue of foreseeability.
In Sledge v. Wagoner,1 9 the Supreme Court of North Carolina
described the basic duty owed by the invitor to his invitee. The
invitor is not an insurer of the safety of business visitors while on
16. Id. at 532, 174 S.E. at 444.
17. 223 N.C. 239, 25 S.E.2d 852 (1943).
18. 247 N.C. 262, 100 S.E.2d 511 (1957).
19. 248 N.C. 631, 104 S.E.2d 195 (1958). In Wagoner, the plaintiff was in-
jured when his trouser leg caught a portion of the restaurant magazine rack caus-
ing him to fall.
1982] 415
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the premises, but the invitor is required to exercise ordinary care
to keep the premises and all parts thereof where patrons may law-
fully go in a safe condition and to warn of all dangerous conditions
which are reasonably ascertainable.20 The test in determining prox-
imate cause, said the Court, is not whether the tortfeasor should
foresee the specific injury that occurred, but whether, "in 'the ex-
ercise of reasonable care, the defendant might have foreseen that
some injury would result ... or that consequences of a generally
injurious nature might have been expected.'" [Citations omit-
ted].21 In Game v. Charles Stores Company, Inc.,22 the Court ex-
tended the invitor's duty to guard against dangerous conditions on
the premises to include the parking lot.
With respect to hazards on the premises caused by third par-
ties, the Supreme Court of North Carolina outlined the plaintiff's
burden in Long v. National Food Stores, Inc.2 In dicta, the Court
stated that in order for an invitee to recover for his injuries proxi-
mately caused by dangerous conditions created by third parties on
the premises, he must show that the invitor knew of the dangerous
condition or that the condition had existed for so long that the
invitor should have known of its existence."' Although Long in-
volved a passive condition on the premises-slippery grape
peels-the dictum was applied in Aaser v. City of Charlotte25 and
Manganello v. Permastone, Inc.,2 6 involving dangerous activities
on the premises. In Aaser, the plaintiff suffered a broken ankle
when youths playing in a corridor struck her with a hockey puck
during a Charlotte hockey match. The Court held that the owner's
duty of care extended to activities on the premises as well as to
physical conditions.2 ' The degree of care, noted the Court, de-
20. Id. at 635, 104 S.E.2d at 198.
21. Id. at 636, 104 S.E.2d at 199.
22. 268 N.C. 676, 151 S.E.2d 560 (1966). In Game, the plaintiff was injured
when an incoming motorist ran over a bottle in the parking lot, causing it to
strike the plaintiff. Although the injury involved the act of a third party, the
Court held the store was negligent in maintaining its parking lot.
23. 262 N.C. 57, 136 S.E.2d 275 (1964).
24. Id. at 60, 136 S.E.2d at 278.
25. 265 N.C. 494, 144 S.E.2d 610 (1965).
26. 291 N.C. 666, 231 S.E.2d 678 (1977).
27. The Court stated:
The duty of the owner extends to the physical condition of the prem-
ises, themselves, and to contemplated and foreseeable activities thereon
by the owner and his employees, the contestants and the spectators. The
amount of care required varies, but the basis of liability for injury to the
[Vol. 4:411416
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pended on the probability of injury and the degree of injury rea-
sonably foreseeable .2 The Court denied the plaintiff's claim, how-
ever, because it found that the plaintiff's evidence did not establish
when or how long the horseplay had continued, nor did it establish
that the precautions taken by the defendants were inadequate.29
The plaintiff in Manganello sought to recover from the owners of a
public swimming pool after he was injured by the activities of
other swimmers.30 Finding that the dangerous activities had con-
tinued for some twenty minutes prior to the plaintiff's injury, and,
also noting the disparity between the defendant's precautions and
those prescribed in safety codes, the Court held that the plaintiff's
claims were proper for a jury to consider. 1
Although the North Carolina cases elaborated upon the in-
vitor's duty to provide safe premises, no cases had dealt with the
shopkeeper's, specifically the shopping center's, liability for inju-
ries caused by criminal conduct on the premises. Cases in other
jurisdictions which discuss foreseeability as a determinent of liabil-
ity may be roughly divided into those cases which expressly reject
foreseeability and those which adopt a broader or narrower scope
of foreseeability. In a case where the plaintiff was assaulted in a
housing project, the Court, in Goldberg v. Housing Authority of
Newark,32 rejected foreseeability as the determinent of a landlord's
duty to secure his premises against criminal attack. The commis-
sion of crime can be foreseen anywhere. But, "whether a duty ex-
ists is ultimately a question of fairness. . . [involving] a weighing
of the relationship of the parties, the nature of the risk, and the
public interest in the proposed solution." The Court found the
potential deployment of private police forces violated the public
policy of New Jersey. But, more importantly, the Court objected to
a duty based on foreseeability because of its "vagueness." How,
pondered the Court, would a landowner determine when a duty to
invitee from any of these sources is the same-the failure of the owner to
use reasonable care under the circumstances.
265 N.C. at 499, 144 S.E.2d at 614-615.
28. Id. at 499, 144 S.E.2d at 615.
29. Id. at 500, 144 S.E.2d at 616.
30. In Manganello, several men were jumping from each others' shoulders
when one landed on the plaintiff's neck. 291 N.C. 666, 668, 231 S.E.2d 678, 679
(1977).
31. Id. at 672-673, 231 S.E.2d at 681-682.
32. 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962).
33. Id. at 583, 186 A.2d at 293.
1982] 417
7
Watson: Tort Law - Merchant's Duty to Protect Invitees from Third-Party C
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1982
CAMPBELL LAW REvmw
protect against third party criminal acts arose and by what stan-
dard would the adequacy of his measures be judged?"
The fairness test articulated in Goldberg provided a broad
theoretical basis for determining liability for third party criminal
acts. As developed in Atamian v. Supermarket General Corp.,35
the New Jersey court held that the defendant supermarket did owe
a duty to a plaintiff who was raped and beaten in its parking lot.
Although five rapes had previously occurred in the lot, no security
guards were employed on the night of the assault and lighting was
poor. The Court noted the economic benefit which the shopper
conferred on the defendant, the customary security at the store
and the poor illumination. Most significantly, it held that it was
neither vague nor unfair to require protection in a parking lot
where five previous assaults had occurred. In language suggesting a
broader scope of foreseeability, the Court stated that the fact that
a criminal act intervenes the negligence of the defendant will not
relieve his liability if the continued likelihood of attack exists.3 6
Unlike Atamian, other cases applying the Goldberg fairness
test have not considered the factors articulated in Goldberg. In-
stead, the courts have simply stated that the landowner's duty to
protect his patrons from criminal activities is a question of fair-
ness, but have found that "fairness" requires no such duty. In
Cook v. Safeway Stores, Inc.3 7 for example, the invitee was injured
as she attempted to recover her wallet from a thief. The Court
noted that the general incidence of crime was predictable in the
area. It commented, however, that it was not foreseeable that the
plaintiff would be assaulted, nor that she would react as she did.s
With North Carolina's traditional view that foreseeability is
an element of proximate cause, it is unlikely that a North Carolina
court would sidestep the issue of foreseeability as the Goldberg
court did. Decisions from other jurisdictions demonstrate that the
scope of foreseeability is an adequate vehicle for defining policy. In
determining whether the invitor owed a duty to secure his prem-
ises against criminal attack, some courts have required that the
34. "It is an easy matter to know whether a stairway is defective and what
repairs will put it in order ... but how can one know what measures will protect
against the thug, the narcotic addict, the degenerate, the psychopath and the
psychotic." Id. at 589, 186 A.2d at 297.
35. 146 N.J. Super. 149, 369 A.2d 38 (1976).
36. Id. at 158-59, 369 A.2d at 43.
37. 354 A.2d 507 (D.C. App. 1976).
38. Id. at 509; See also Cornpropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188 (Tenn. 1975).
418 [Vol. 4:411
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likelihood of a specific incident-the one which occurred-be fore-
seeable.39 Other courts have adopted the less stringent foreseeabil-
ity of the Restatement,'0 requiring only that a sufficient incidence
of crime be shown to impose the duty.4 1
The Tennessee Supreme Court in Cornpropst v. Sloan,'2 ex-
pressly rejected the broader view of foreseeability and the view of §
344 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Following her assault in
defendants' shopping center parking lot, the plaintiff alleged "...
there had been committed various crimes, assaults, and other acts
of violence, either on the premises or in the immediate area" of the
shopping center which rendered it unsafe for shoppers at night.'
The Court held that owners or operators of a shopping center, and
shopkeepers in general, do not have a duty to guard against crimi-
nal acts of third parties unless they know or have reason to know
of acts occurring or about to occur on the premises which pose animminent probability of harm to an invitee." In its reasoning, the
Court rejected foreseeability based on the occurrence of numerous
criminal acts.'5 The Tennessee Court indicated that for a duty to
arise the imminent probability of the act by the specific offender
must be foreseeable. The Court found nothing in the plaintiffs al-
legations which would have given notice of impending assault
before her attack.46 Assuming she had stated a cause of action, the
Court found her allegations established that the assailant's acts
were an unforeseen, intervening cause of her injuries.'7
In O'Brien v. Colonial Village, Inc.,' s and Morgan v. Bucks
Associates,'9 the courts adopted the broader view of foreseeability
39. See infra text accompanying notes 42-47.
40. RESTATEMENT (SacoND) oF ToRTs § 344 (1965); see supra note 7.
41. See infra text accompanying notes 48-52.
42. 528 S.W.2d 188 (Tenn. 1975).
43. Id. at 190.
44. Id. at 198.
45. Id. at 197.
46. Id. The Court reasoned:
We are concerned in this case with the liability of the business es-
tablishments in Eastgate Shopping Center for the sudden criminal act of
a temporarily or permanently depraved person, who according to the af-
firmative allegations contained in the complaint gave no notice by word,
act, dress or deed prior to the commission of the attack that would have
indicated to anyone an intention or purpose to commit an assault.
47. Id. at 198.
48. 119 Ill. App. 2d 105, 255 N.E.2d 205 (1970).
49. 428 F. Supp. 546 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
1982] 419
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advocated in the Restatement. Both cases arose after the plaintiffs
were assaulted in shopping center parking lots. In O'Brien," the
Illinois court recognized that a cause of action would exist, but
found that plaintiff had failed to allege sufficient facts from which
a jury could determine the defendants' knowledge. In Morgan,1
however, the plaintiff produced evidence showing seventy-seven
prior car thefts in the parking lot where her assault occurred. Her
evidence also indicated that not more than one security guard pa-
trolled defendants' one hundred-forty acre parking lot once each
hour. The Court in Morgan held that evidence of the numerous
crimes committed in defendants' parking lot was sufficient for a
jury to find that the defendant knew or had reason to know of the
likelihood of injury caused by the conduct of third persons.52
In summary, prior to Foster, North Carolina followed the gen-
eral rule that one does not owe another a duty to protect him from
criminal acts because of the unforeseeability of such acts."3 Never-
theless, the Supreme Court's decisions in Aaser and Manganeilo
suggested that those who hold their premises open to the public
owe a duty to guard against the injurious conduct, though not the
crimes, of third parties on the premises if the injurious nature of
the conduct is foreseeable." With respect to hazards on the prem-
ises caused by criminal conduct, decisions from other jurisdictions
offered the Court a number of options. Among these, the Court
might have rejected a duty to guard against criminal acts on policy
grounds, as the Goldberg Court did." Otherwise, the Court might
have tailored the duty by adopting a restrictive scope of foresee-
ability as in Cornpropst,56 or by adopting the broader scope of
foreseeability advanced in Morgan and the Restatement."
50. In O'Brien, the plaintiff had alleged a series of specific incidents in her
original complaint, but these were omitted following amendment. 119 m. App. 2d
105, 106, 255 N.E.2d 205, 206 (1970).
51. 428 F. Supp. 546 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
52. Id. at 548. Although defendants provided evidence that they hired two to
five security guards for peak hours, the plaintiff had not seen a security guard in
the five months she worked at the mall. On the night of the assault, police officers
found no security guards in the lot.
53. See supra text accompanying notes 2-4, 15-18.
54. 265 N.C. 494, 144 S.E.2d 610 (1965); 291 N.C. 666, 231 S.E.2d 678 (1978);
see supra text accompanying notes 25-31.
55. 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962); see supra text accompanying notes 32-
34.
56. 528 S.W.2d 188 (Tenn. 1975); see supra text accompanying notes 42-47.
57. See supra text accompanying notes 48-52; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) op
[Vol. 4:411
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ANALYSIS
In holding that the plaintiff had presented a claim for relief in
negligence against the shopping mall owners, the majority in Fos-
ter adopted the position of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, §
344.68 As the Court of Appeals had noted, this did not represent a
"pioneering step." 59 A respectable body of North Carolina caselaw
supported the majority's view.10 Quoting the Court's opinion in
Aaser v. City of Charlotte,"" the majority noted:
In the place of amusement or exhibition, just as in the store,
when the dangerous condition or activity. . . arises from the act
of third persons, whether themselves invitees or not, the owner is
not liable for injury resulting unless he knew of its existence or it
had existed long enough for him to have discovered it by the ex-
ercise of due diligence and to have removed or warned against
it.62
After comparing the similarity between Aaser and other North
Carolina cases and the Restatement position, the majority declared
that foreseeability was the test for determining the extent of a
landowner's duty to his invitees."
In support of its holding, the majority also relied on similar
cases from other jurisdictions, most notably Morgan v. Bucks As-
sociates" and O'Brien v. Colonial Village Inc." Both cases recog-
nized the existence of a negligence action against shopping center
owners. In reviewing the plaintiff's allegations, the majority found
that the plaintiff had alleged at least twenty-nine criminal inci-
dents had occurred at Hanes Mall in the year preceding her as-
sault." The plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to state a cause of
TORTs § 344, supra note 7; 428 F. Supp. 546 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
58. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TorTs § 344, supra note 7.
59. 50 N.C. App. 516, 518, 274 S.E.2d 265, 267 (1981).
60. See supra text accompanying notes 19-31.
61. 265 N.C. 494, 499, 144 S.E.2d 610, 615 (1965).
62. Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture, 303 N.C. 636, 639, 281 S.E.2d 36,
38 (1981).
63. Id. at 638-640, 281 S.E.2d at 38-39.
64. 428 F. Supp. 546 (E.D. Pa. 1977); See supra text accompanying notes 49,
51-52.
65. 119 I1. App. 2d 105, 255 N.E.2d 705 (1970); See supra text accompanying
notes 48, 50.
66. Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture, 303 N.C. 636, 641, 281 S.E.2d 36,
39 (1981).
1982]
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action in negligence. 6
In support of their motion for summary judgment, the defen-
dants had claimed that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evi-
dence of the foreseeability of criminal activity to establish defen-
dants' duty. They also contended that the plaintiff had failed to
present evidence of the inadequacy of defendants' security precau-
tions. The majority ruled, however, that defendants' answer to the
plaintiff's interrogatories, acknowledging thirty-one previous brimi-
nal incidents, was sufficient to establish foreseeability.18 The depo-
sition of the mall manager, in which he stated that only one secur-
ity guard patrolled the mall parking lot on the date of plaintiff's
assault, similarly rebutted the defendants' second contention.69
In dissent, Justice Carlton expressed concern that the majority
had created a duty of "potentially limitless scope."70 Noting lan-
guage in Cook v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,71 the Justice criticized fore-
seeability of criminal conduct as a basis for the landowners' duty.72
Criminal activity could be foreseen by almost anyone at almost any
place. Theoretically, this would produce a wide-spread duty to pro-
vide armed protection.73 Adopting the view of Goldberg v. Housing
Authority of Newark,7 the dissent stated that whether a duty ex-
ists is a question of fairness.7 In determining what is "fair" the
court should consider the relationship of the parties, the nature of
the risk and the public interest. But, according to Justice Carlton,
fairness also requires that one be able to determine his duty in
advance and that he know what measures are adequate. But how
can one know what measures will prevent criminal conduct and by
what standards can the landowner's efforts be gauged?76 Like the
Court in Goldberg, Justice Carlton also objected to the prospect of
private security forces becoming, in effect, private police forces."7
67. Id.
68. Id. at 642, 281 S.E.2d at 40.
69. Id. at 643, 281 S.E.2d at 40.
70. Id. at 643, 281 S.E.2d at 41 (Carlton, J., dissenting).
71. 354 A.2d 507 (D.C. 1976). See supra accompanying notes 37-38.
72. Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture, 303 N.C. 636, 643, 281 S.E.2d 36,
41 (1981) (Carlton, J., dissenting).
73. Id.
74. 38 N.J. 578, 583, 186 A.2d 291, 293 (1962). See supra text accompanying
notes 32-34.
75. Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture, 303 N.C. 636, 644, 281 S.E.2d 36,
41 (1981) (Carlton, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 644-654, 281 S.E.2d at 41-42.
77. Id. at 645, 281 S.E.2d at 42.
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Even assuming that a landowners' duty to protect invitees
from injury by third parties existed, the dissenting Justice did not
believe a duty arose in Foster.7 8 Noting that of nearly thirty-seven
criminal incidents reported at the Hanes Mall, only six or seven
had involved assaults, he questioned the foreseeability of assault.
Foreseeability should be no broader than the type of criminal inci-
dent that had previously occurred.79 Accordingly, frequent inci-
dents of larceny could not make the risk of criminal assault
foreseeable."
Lastly, the Justice objected that the plaintiff did not allege
facts sufficient to show that criminal assault was foreseeable. Her
shortcoming was that she failed to allege that the incidence of
criminal assault exceeded that found in the surrounding neighbor-
hood.81 According to the dissent, if the incidence of crime in the
neighborhood equals that found in the shopping center, the shop-
per "was simply taking a known and accepted risk of venturing
out. 8 2 Queried the dissent, "What right does a patron have to de-
mand that the store premises be safer than the general area in
which it is situated?"8
Although Justice Carlton's dissent adopted the language and
the approach of Goldberg," he did not specifically disparage the
majority's foreseeability test for its "vagueness." Yet, one might
argue that "vagueness", however else it is termed, is a shortcoming
of the decision. The majority opinion provides no numerical guide-
lines for determining at what point injuries resulting from criminal
assault become so foreseeable that a duty of protection falls on the
landowner.85 The opinion, also, does not define a reasonable stan-
78. Id. at 645-646, 281 S.E.2d at 42.
79. Id. at 646-647, 281 S.E.2d at 42-43.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 647, 281 S.E.2d at 43.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962); See supra text accompanying notes 32-
34.
85. The Court stated:We cannot hold as a matter of law that the thirty-one criminal inci-
dents reported as occurring on the shopping mall premises within the
year preceding the assault on plaintiff were insufficient to charge defen-
dants with knowledge that such injuries were likely to occur. The issue of
foreseeability should therefore be determined by the jury.
Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture, 303 N.C. 636, 642, 281 S.W.2d 36, 40
(1981).
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dard of precaution. In Foster, as well as Morgan v. Bucks' Associ-
ates"6 and O'Brien v. Colonial Village, Inc.,87 relied on by the ma-
jority, one could characterize the level of precautions as grossly
inadequate.s" Again, how many and how often should security
guards patrol a seventy-six acre parking lot?
The "vagueness", or perhaps flexibility, of the foreseeability
test announced in Foster, however, is not a fault of the decision.
Even if the decision is subsequently construed as establishing a
form of strict liability, there is something positive to be said for
this. Increasingly, legislatures have recognized that victims of
crime are entitled to restitution or reparation.8' In North Carolina,
restitution or reparation may be imposed as a condition of proba-
tion, parole and plea bargaining negotiations."e Unfortunately, it is
well known that many offenders are never caught and most lack
the resources to adequately compensate their victims. Foster, then,
holds out hope that victims of crime may receive fair compensa-
tion. It can be argued that it is unfair to saddle the business com-
munity with liability for societal crime. 1 But, has it ever been fair
86. 428 F. Supp. 546 (E.D. Pa. 1977). See supra text accompanying notes 49,
51-52.
87. 119 Ill. App. 2d 105, 555 N.E.2d 205 (1970). See supra text accompanying
notes 48-50.
88. In O'Brien, the defendants provided no security. In Morgan, defendants
provided security during peak times. But, several witnesses testified that they had
seen guards in the parking lot only once every two or three weeks, despite the
occurrence of seventy-seven car thefts in one year. In Foster, only one guard was
on duty to patrol the entire seventy-six acre premises during the Christmas
season.
89. Note, Compensating Victims of Crime: Evolving Concept or Dying The-
ory?, 82 W. VA. L. Rav. 89, 90 (1979). (1979-1980). In 1979, twenty-two states had
comprehensive, state-administered programs for compensating victims.
90. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1021(d) (Cum. Supp. 1981) sanctions reparation
and restitution in plea bargaining; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1343(d) (Cum. Supp.
1981) provides for restitution as condition of probation; N.C. GE. STAT. § 15A-
1374(11a) (Cum. Supp. 1981) provides for restitution as condition of parole pursu-
ant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-57.1 (1978).
91. The Court in Davis v. Allied Supermarkets, Inc. 547 P.2d 963, 965 (Okla.
1976) stated:
In all cases of purse snatching, it could be said that there were not
enough guards. If there had been enough guards, the offense would not
have occurred. This being true, to sustain the appellants' position would
for all practical purposes put the business owner in the position of an
insurer. An insurer against what? Crime.
One may argue the social advantages of shifting or equalizing the
burden of victims of crime, but aside from the question of propriety in
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that the victims alone should bear these costs? The justification
for business liability is that the business community can spread
the costs of crime through insurance and pricing-something the
individual cannot do. If one assumes that crime is a product of
pervasive societal conditions, it is not unfair to require society to
bear the ultimate costs to those injured.
Secondly, it has been asserted that placing the burden on the
shopkeeper or landowner will result in the most effective deter-
rence of criminal activity." Recent studies point out that crime oc-
curs in a negative proportion to the risk of detection. 93 Through
various means, the shopkeeper or landowner is more able to in-
crease the risk of detection and reduce crime than the solitary
shopper." Presumably, those businesses where shoppers perceive
that the premises are secure will benefit from increased patronage.
CONCLUSION
Certainly, there is no absolute deterrent to an isolated crimi-
nal act. But, just as the decision in Foster recognizes that a cause
of action may lie for the invitee who is assaulted on the invitor's
premises, the decision also leaves open the two determinative ques-
this litigation, it does not seem that shifting the financial loss caused by
crime from one innocent victim to another innocent victim is proper.
92. Bazyler, The Duty To Provide Adequate Protection: Landowner's Liabil-
ity for Failure to Protect Patrons from Criminal Attack, 21 ARIz. L. Rpv. 727
(1979).
93. Id. at 732-733. Citing J. CONCKLiN, Tim IMPACT OF CRim 3 (1975) and the
LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL
VICTIMIZATION T mT UNITED STATES: A COMPARISON OF 1973 AND 1974 FINDINGS
(1977), the author summarizes:
There has been a recognition that of all the things an individual, a
business, or the community can do to reduce crime, the most direct ap-
proach is to eliminate the obvious opportunities for criminals .... If
the risk of being apprehended is large, many potential attackers and in-
truders will not commit the crime.
94. Id. at 747-748.
First, of all the involved parties, the cost of crime reduction is
cheapest to the landowner. For the criminal, imposing civil liability on
him in addition to existing criminal sanctions does not deter him from
committing the crime. Imposing duty on the patron, so that he must pro-
tect and compensate himself, may result in crime reduction, but only at
the expensive cost of the patron staying home .... The landowner holds
many options, ranging from installation of better lighting, fences, or
guard service, to even varying hours of operation. All of these options
should be less expensive and much more effective in deterring crime than
the patron's sole choice of staying home.
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tions of fact. What pattern or incidence of criminal activity must
occur on the premises before the likelihood of injury becomes fore-
seeable and imposes a duty on the invitor? Secondly, what security
measures adopted by an invitor are adequate in the exercise of rea-
sonable care? Under the rule announced in Foster, both are ques-
tions of fact for the jury. Despite the occurrence of isolated crimes,
it is possible that shoppers, the invitees, may generally view the
invitor's premises as well protected. An isolated crime is not con-
clusive of a breach; Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture does
not mandate absolute deterrence.
The Court's decision in Foster presents hard questions which
it does not answer. Yet, the recognition of the invitor's duty to se-
cure his premises against foreseeable criminal activities, and a cor-
responding cause of action in negligence should advance socially
desirable objectives. In some instances, it will enable compensation
for the victims of crime. But, more importantly, Foster should stir
an economically significant awareness of crime as well as the eco-
nomic incentive to deter it. In this latter respect, the "vagueness"
of Foster's foreseeability test may prove to be its greatest benefit.
John W. Watson, Jr.
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